Abstract. We present a novel translation of systems that are tolerant of crash failures to systems that are tolerant of Byzantine failures in an asynchronous environment, making weaker assumptions than previous approaches. In particular, we assume little about how the application is coded. The translation exploits an extension of the Srikanth-Toueg protocol, supporting ordering in addition to authentication and persistent delivery. We illustrate the approach by synthesizing a version of the Castro and Liskov Practical Byzantine Replication protocol from the Oki and Liskov Viewstamped Replication protocol.
Introduction
Developing applications that span multiple administrative domains is difficult if the environment is asynchronous and machines may exhibit arbitrary failures. Yet, this is a problem that many software developers face today. While we know how to build replicated data stores that tolerate Byzantine behavior (e.g., [4] ), most applications go well beyond providing a data store. Tools like Byzantine consensus may help developing such applications, but most software developers find dealing with arbitrary failures extremely challenging. They often make simplifying assumptions like a crash failure model, relying on careful monitoring to detect and fix problems that occur when such assumptions are violated.
We are interested in techniques that automatically transform crash-tolerant applications into Byzantine-tolerant applications that do not require careful monitoring and repair.
This paper makes the following contributions. First we present a novel ordered broadcast protocol that we will use as a building block. The protocol is an extension of the Srikanth and Toueg authenticated broadcast protocol often used in Byzantine consensus protocols [11] , adding consistent ordering for messages from the same sender even in the face of Byzantine behavior. Second, we present a new way of translating a distributed application that is tolerant of crash failures into one that tolerates the same number of Byzantine failures, while imposing fewer restrictions on how the application is constructed than previous approaches. Third, we show how a version of the Castro and Liskov Practical Byzantine Replication protocol [4] can be derived from the Oki and Liskov Viewstamped Replication protocol [10] using our translation technique, something not possible with previous approaches.
We present background in Sect. 2. After describing a system model in Sect. 3, we introduce three mechanisms used for translation: Authenticated Reliable broadcast (Sect. 4), Ordered Authenticast Reliable broadcast (Sect. 5), and the translation mechanism itself (Sect. 6). Correctness proofs for these appear in the appendix. In Sect. 7 we demonstrate the translation mechanism.
Background
The idea of automatically translating crash-tolerant systems into Byzantine systems can be traced back to the mid-eighties. Gabriel Bracha used a translation similar to ours to generate a consensus protocol tolerant of t Byzantine failures out of 3t+1 hosts [3] . Brian Coan also presents a translation [6] that is similar to Bracha's. The most important restriction in these approaches is that input protocols are required to have a specific style of execution, and in particular they have to be round-based with each participant awaiting the receipt of n − t messages before starting a new round. These requirements exclude, for example, protocols that designate roles to senders and receivers such as the primary role used in Viewstamped Replication [10] . Our approach makes no such assumptions, and we will demonstrate our approach for Viewstamped Replication.
Toueg, Neiger and Bazzi worked on an extension of Bracha's and Coan's approaches for translation of synchronous systems [9, 2, 1] . Their approach takes advantage of synchrony to detect faulty hosts and eliminate them from the protocol. The extension can be applied to our scheme as well.
Most recently, Mpoeleng et al. [8] present a translation that is intended for synchronous systems, and transforms Byzantine faults to so-called signal-onfailure faults. They replace each host with a pair, and assume only one of the hosts in each pair may fail. They require 4t + 2 hosts, but the system may break with as few as two failures no matter how large t is chosen.
System Model
In order to be precise we present a simple model to talk about machines, processes, and networks. The model consists of agents and links. An agent is an active entity that maintains state, receives messages on incoming links, performs some processing based on this input and its state, possibly updating its state and producing output messages on outgoing links.
Links are abstract unidirectional FIFO channels between two agents. Agents can interact across links only. In particular, an agent can enqueue a message on one of its outgoing links, and it can dequeue messages from one of its incoming links (assuming a message is available there).
We use agents and links to model various activities and interactions. Processes that run on hosts are agents, but the network is also an agent-one that forwards messages from its incoming links to its outgoing links according to some policy. Agents are named by lower-case Greek letters α, β, .... For agents that are processes, we will use subscripts on names to denote which hosts they run on. For example, β i is an agent that runs on host h i .
Hosts are containers for agents, and they are also the unit of failure. Hosts are either honest, executing programs as specified, or Byzantine [7] , exhibiting arbitrary behavior. We also use the terms correct and faulty, but not as alternatives to honest and Byzantine. A correct host is honest and always eventually makes progress. A faulty host is a Byzantine host or an honest host that has crashed or will eventually crash. Honest and Byzantine are mutually exclusive, as are correct and faulty. However, a host can be both honest and faulty.
We do not assume timing bounds on execution of agents. Latency in the network is modeled as execution delay in a network agent. Note that this prevents hosts from accurately detecting crashes of other hosts. Agents are represented by circles, links by arrows, and hosts by rectangles. The top half models two application agents β 1 and β 2 running on two hosts h 1 and h 2 communicating using a FIFO network agent φ. The bottom half refines the FIFO network using an unreliable network agent ν and two protocol agents φ S 1 and φ R 2 that implement ordering and retransmission using sequence numbers, timers, and acknowledgment messages. This kind of refinement will be a common theme throughout this paper.
The ARcast Mechanism
The first mechanism we present is Authenticated Reliable broadcast (ARcast). This broadcast mechanism was suggested by Srikanth and Toueg, and they present an implementation that does not require digital signatures in [11] . Their implementation requires n > 3t. As shown below, it is also possible to develop an implementation that uses digital signatures, in which case n only has to be larger than 2t.
ARcast Definition
Assume β i , ... are agents communicating using ARcast on hosts h i , .... Then ARcast provides the following properties:
1. bc-Persistence. If two hosts h i and h j are correct, and β i sends a message m, then β j delivers m from β i ; 2. bc-Relay. If h i is honest and h j is correct, and β i delivers m from β k , then β j delivers m from β k (host h k is not necessarily correct); 3. bc-Authenticity. If two hosts h i and h j are honest and β i does not send m, then β j does not deliver m from β i .
Informally, ARcast ensures that a message is reliably delivered to all correct receivers in case the sender is correct (bc-Persistence) or in case another honest receiver has delivered the message already (bc-Relay). Moreover, a Byzantine host cannot forge messages from an honest host (bc-Authenticity).
ARcast Implementation
We assume there is a single sender β i on h i . We model ARcast as a network agent ξ i , which we refine by replacing it with the following agents (see Fig. 2 The mechanism has to be instantiated for each sender. The sending host h i runs the ARcast sender agent ξ S i . Each receiving host h j runs a receiver agent ξ R j . There have to be at least 2t + 1 receiving hosts, one of which may be h i . When ξ S i wants to ARcast a message m, it sends echo m, i i , signed by h i using its public key signature, to all receivers. A receiver that receives such an echo message for the first time forwards it to all receivers. On receipt of t + 1 of these correctly signed echoes for the same m from different receivers (it can count an echo from itself), a receiver delivers m from i.
Due to space considerations, we omit the (simple) correctness proof.
The OARcast Mechanism
ARcast does not provide any ordering. Even messages from a correct sender may be delivered in different orders at different receivers. Next we introduce a broadcast mechanism that is like ARcast, but adds delivery order for messages sent by either honest or Byzantine hosts.
OARcast Definition
OARcast provides, in addition to the ARcast properties, the following:
4. bc-FIFO. If two hosts h i and h j are honest and β i sends m 1 before m 2 , and β j delivers m 1 and m 2 from β i , then β j delivers m 1 before m 2 ; 5. bc-Ordering. If two hosts h i and h j are honest and β i and β j both deliver m 1 from β k and m 2 from β k , then they do so in the same order (even if h k is Byzantine).
As a result of bc-Ordering, even a Byzantine sender cannot cause two honest receivers to deliver OARcast messages from the same source out of order. bc-FIFO ensures that messages from honest hosts are delivered in the order sent. OARcast does not guarantee any order among messages from different sources, and is thus weaker than consensus. We describe how OARcast may be implemented using ARcast. Again, we show the implementation for a single sender β i on host h i . With multiple senders, the implementation has to be instantiated for each sender separately. We refine the OARcast network agent ω i by replacing it with the following agents (see Fig. 3 ): ω S i sender agent that is in charge of the sending side of the OARcast mechanism; ω O * orderer agents that are in charge of ordering; ω R * receiver agents that are in charge of the receive side; φ FIFO network agent that provides point-to-point authenticated FIFO communication from the sender agent to each orderer agent; ξ * ARcast network agents each provides ARcast from a particular orderer agent to all receiver agents.
OARcast Implementation
We need to run 3t + 1 orderers on separate hosts, of which no more than t may fail. A host may end up running a sender, a receiver, as well as an orderer. A receiver ω , it ARcasts order m, t k , i to each of the receivers, and increments t k . A receiver ω R j awaits 2t + 1 messages order m, c j , i from different orderers before delivering m from ω S i . After doing so, the receiver increments c j . We prove the correctness of this implementation in Appendix A.
In this section, we describe how an arbitrary protocol tolerant only of crash failures can be translated into a protocol that tolerates Byzantine failures.
Definition
Below we use the terms original and translated to distinguish the system before and after translation, respectively. The original system tolerates only crash failures, while the translated system tolerates Byzantine failures as well. The original system consists of n hosts, each of which runs an actor agent, α 1 , . . . , α n . Each actor α i is a state machine that maintains a running state s i , initially s i 0 , and, upon receiving an input message m, executes a deterministic state transition function The state transition functions process one input message at a time and may have no computational time bound. Actors in the original system communicate via a FIFO network agent φ. Each actor maintains a pair of input-output links with the FIFO network agent. When an actor α i wants to send a message m to another actor α j (may be itself), α i formats m (detailed below) and enqueues it on α i 's output link. We call this action α i sends m to α j . φ dequeues m from the link and places it into the message buffer that φ maintains. Eventually φ removes m from its buffer and enqueues m on the input link of α j . When α j dequeues m we say that α j delivers m from α i . The original system assumes the following of the network:
1. α-Persistence. If two hosts h i and h j are correct and α i sends m to α j , then α j delivers m from α i . 2. α-Authenticity. If two hosts h i and h j are honest and α i does not send m to α j , then α j does not deliver m from α i . 3. α-FIFO. If two hosts h i and h j are honest and α i sends m 1 before m 2 , and α j delivers m 1 and m 2 from α i , then α j delivers m 1 before m 2 ;
Note that in the original system all hosts are honest. However, for the translation we need to be able to generalize these properties to include Byzantine hosts. Messages in the original system are categorized as internal or external. Internal messages are sent between actors and are formatted as d, i, j , where d is the data (or payload), i indicates the source actor, and j indicates the destination actor. External messages are from clients to actors and are formatted as d, ⊥, j , similar to the format of internal messages except the source actor is empty (⊥). Internal and external messages are in general called α-messages, or simply messages when the context is clear.
In the original system all actors produce output messages by making transitions based on input as specified by the protocol. We call such output messages valid. We formalize validity below.
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.).next).next)
.output. The expression means that actor α i sends m after it has processed the first c input messages, be they internal or external. Note that external input forms the base case for this recursive definition, as actors produce no internal messages until at least one delivers an external message. In order for the original system to work correctly, each actor needs to make transitions based on valid input. More formally, 4. α-Validity. If h i is honest and α i delivers m from α j , then m is valid.
The property is granted to the original system by default, because it is in an environment where faulty hosts follow the protocol faithfully until they crash.
Besides the four α-properties, the original system requires no other assumptions about communication among actors. However, the original system may require non-communication assumptions such as "up to t hosts can fail."
The Translation mechanism transforms a crash-tolerant system in which all hosts require the four α-properties into a Byzantine-tolerant system that preserves the α-properties.
Implementation
In the original system, each actor α i runs on a separate host h i . In the translated system each host simulates the entire original system (see Fig. 4 ). That is, a host runs a replica of each of the n actors and passes messages between the actors internally using a simulated network agent, called coordinator, that runs on the host. We denote the coordinator running on host h i as κ i . To ensure that the different hosts stay synchronized, the coordinators agree on the order in which messages are delivered to replicas of the same actor. The replica of α i on host h j is called α Each coordinator replaces φ of the original system by OARcast, i.e., OARcast is used to send messages. OARcast guarantees that coordinators agree on the delivery of messages to replicas of a particular actor. Coordinators wrap each α-message in a κ-message. κ-messages have the form tag m, i , where tag is either internal or external, m is an α-message, and i indicates the destination actor. Each coordinator maintains an unordered message bag and n peractor-replica message queues. By B i we denote the message bag at host i and by Q j i we denote the message queue for actor α j i at host i (see Fig. 5 ). The pseudo-code for a coordinator κ i appears in Fig. 6 . κ i intercepts messages from local actors, and it receives messages from remote coordinators. κ i places α-messages sent by local actor replicas in B i , and places α-messages received within κ-messages from κ j in Q j i . When there is a match between a message m in the bag and the head of a queue, the coordinator enqueues m for the corresponding actor.
The translated system guarantees α-Persistence, α-Authenticity, α-FIFO, and α-Validity to all master actors on honest hosts. Appendix B contains a proof of correctness. 
Illustration: BFT
In 1999 Castro and Liskov published "Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance," a paper about a replication protocol (BFT) for a Byzantine-tolerant NFS file system [4] . The paper shows that BFT is indeed practical, adding relatively little overhead to NFS. In this section we show, informally, that a protocol much like BFT can be synthesized from the Viewstamped Replication protocol by Oki and Liskov [10] and the transformations of the current paper. The main difference is that our protocol is structured, while BFT is largely monolithic. In our opinion, the structure simplifies understanding and enhances the ability to scrutinize the protocol. The BFT paper addresses several practical issues and possible optimizations that can be applied to our scheme as well, but omitted for brevity.
Viewstamped Replication is a consensus protocol. A normal case execution is shown in Fig. 7(a) .
2 A client sends a request to a server that is elected primary. The primary server sends an archive message to each server in the system. If a quorum responds to the client, the request is completed successfully. In the case of failures, a possibly infinite number of rounds of this consensus protocol may be necessary to reach a decision.
If we were to apply translation literally as described, we would end up with a protocol that sends significantly more messages than BFT. The reason for this is two-fold. First, our translation does nothing to group related information from a particular sender to a particular receiver in single messages. Instead, all pieces of information go out, concurrently, in separate small messages. While explicit optimizations could eliminate these, FIFO protocols like TCP automatically aggregate concurrent traffic between a pair of hosts into single messages for efficiency, obviating the need for any explicit optimizations. Note that while these techniques reduce the number of messages, the messages become larger and the number of rounds remains the same.
Second, the translation would produce a protocol that solves uniform Byzantine consensus [5] , guaranteeing that if two honest servers decide on an update, they decide on the same update. In a Byzantine environment, one may argue that this property is stronger than needed. We only need that if two correct servers decide on an update, they decide the same update. The reason for this is that clients of the system have to deal with the results from Byzantine servers, and because Byzantine and crashing hosts are both counted towards t it is not usually a problem that an honest server makes a "mistake" before crashing. Such servers would be outvoted by correct servers.
BFT does not provide uniform consensus, but Viewstamped Replication does. Our translation maintains uniformity. This arises in the bc-Relay property, which requires that if an honest host delivers a message, then all correct hosts have to do the same. For our purposes, it would be sufficient to require that if a correct host delivers a message, all correct hosts have to follow suit.
If we revisit the ARcast implementation, we see that the protocol maintains the original uniform bc-Relay property by having a receiver await t + 1 copies of a message before delivery. Doing so makes sure that one of the copies was sent by a correct receiver that forwards a copy to all other correct receivers as well. For non-uniform bc-Relay this is unnecessary because the receiver itself, if correct, is guaranteed to forward the message to all other correct receivers, and thus a receiver can deliver the message as soon as the first copy is received. The echo traffic can be piggybacked on future traffic.
Using this modification, Fig. 7 (b) demonstrates a normal run of the translated system for t = 1. The figure only shows the traffic that is causally prior to the reply received by the client and thus essential to the latency that the client experiences. In this particular translation we used t additional hosts for OARcast only, but a more faithful translation would have started with 3t + 1 servers. Nevertheless, the run closely resembles that of a normal run of BFT (see Figure 1 of [4] ).
Conclusion
We presented a mechanism to translate a distributed application that tolerates only crash failures into one that tolerates Byzantine failures. Few restrictions are placed on the application, and the approach is applicable not only to consensus but to a large class of distributed applications. The approach makes use of a novel broadcast protocol. We have illustrated how the approach may be used to derive a version of the Castro and Liskov Practical Byzantine Replication protocol, showing that our translation mechanism is pragmatic and more powerful than previous translation approaches. Proof. This is a straightforward corollary of Lemma 1. Proof. Evident from the FIFOness of messages from senders to orderers and the sequence numbers utilized by orderers and receivers.
A Correctness of OARcast

B Correctness of Translation
We prove correctness of the Translation mechanism assuming the bc-properties. In particular, we show that the collection of coordinators and slave replicas that use the Translation mechanism preserves the α-properties: α-Persistence, α-Authenticity, α-FIFO, and α-Validity, for the master replicas {α i i }. For convenience, we combine bc-Relay and bc-Ordering to state that coordinators on correct hosts deliver the same sequence of κ-messages from any κ k , even if h k is Byzantine. This is put more formally in the following lemma: Lemma 4. For any i, j, and k, if h i and h j are correct, then κ i and κ j deliver the same sequence of messages from κ k .
Proof. bc-Relay guarantees that κ i and κ j deliver the same set of messages from κ k . bc-Ordering further guarantees that the delivery order between any two messages is the same at both κ i and κ j .
In the proof we need to be able to compare states of hosts. We represent the state of host h i by a vector of counters, Φ i = (c deliver are the contents of the first c κ-messages that κ i and κ j delivered from κ k , resp. By Lemma 4, the two κ-message sequences are identical. This and the fact that links from coordinators to actors are FIFO imply that the first c messages that α Proof. By Lemma 5 and because replicas of the same actor start in the same state and are deterministic, if Φ produces m on a correct host, Φ produces m on all correct hosts that reach Φ.
We now show that if a correct host is in a particular state then all other correct hosts will reach this state.
Lemma 6.
If there is a correct host h i in state Φ, then, eventually, all correct hosts reach Φ.
Proof. By induction on Φ. All correct hosts start in state Φ 0 = (0, . . . , 0), and ∀Φ = Φ 0 : Φ 0 < Φ. Base case: All correct hosts reach Φ 0 by definition. Inductive case: Say that correct host h i is in state Φ = (c 1 , . . . , c n ), and the lemma holds for all Φ < Φ (Induction Hypothesis). We need to show that any correct host h j reaches Φ.
Consider the last message m that some actor replica α
